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ARTICLES

Jural Rights under Kentucky's
Constitution: Realities Grounded in
Myth
By THoMAS P. Lewis*
INTRODUCTION

Building on three sections of the Constitution of Kentucky, the
Kentucky Supreme Court has erected a remarkable structure it calls
"jural rights." The structure is home principally to the common
law of torts governing injuries to persons and property, but if they
relate to that body of law, other judge-made precedents may find
a home there. The structure is remarkable because only judges may
enter; the General Assembly is locked out.
The structure's foundation is made of these three sections from
the present constitution, adopted in 1891:
Section 14. All courts shall be open, and every person for an
injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall
have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay.
Section 54. The General Assembly shall have no power to limit
the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for
injuries to person or property.
* William T. Lafferty Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law.
B.A. 1959, LL.B. 1954, University of Kentucky; S.J.D. 1964, Harvard University. My
interest in this and other Kentucky constitutional law topics was kindled during a seminar
on the Kentucky Constitution conducted at the College of Law in the Fall of 1991. Chief
Justice Robert F. Stephens of the Kentucky Supreme Court and I offered the seminar as a
team, and we plan to continue the enterprise. The topic of this Article was one of many
addressed in the 600 pages of cases and other materials for the seminar. I want to
acknowledge the effort of seminar student Frank N. Gilmore, with whom I had many
discussions, and whose 1991 paper, Jural Rights and the Kentucky Constitution: An Examination and Critique, is on file in the University of Kentucky Law Library.
Most of my research for the Article was conducted after the close of the seminar. The
views and opinions offered here are my own, and differ markedly from those expressed in
some cases of the Supreme Court in which Chief Justice Stephens participated.
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Section 241. Whenever the death of a person shall result from an
injury inflicted by negligence or wrongful act, then, in every such
case, damages may be recovered for such death, from the corporations and persons so causing the same....
The language of section 14 has been a constant in Kentucky constitutional history since 1792.' Sections 54 and 241 first appeared
in the 1891 constitution.
It has become customary for the justices of the Kentucky
Supreme Court to string cite all three sections in support of the
various propositions composing the doctrine of jural rights, as if
the provisions are repetitious statements of a single theme. It is
undoubtedly the case, however, that some justices see the three
sections as interlocking strands that restrain the General Assembly
in a web from which there is no escape. In either event, the court
frequently refers to the sections in combination as the "open
2
courts" provisions of the constitution.
For any that have been conditioned by the oft-repeated language of the 1932 case Ludwig v. Johnson,3 a once-over reading
of the sections may easily (too easily, I will suggest) lead to the
conclusion that the framers of the constitution, not the court, built
the structure of jural rights we see today. A closer reading prompts
a number of questions. For example, what was the intended function of the words "due course of law" in section 14? Section 54
contains no reference to negligence, wrongful act, or other tort
concept. Its language supposes the occurrence of injuries for which
recovery of damages is allowed, but many injuries were damnum
absque injuria in 1891, and are now. What assumptions occupied
the minds of the framers regarding the sources of law that define
substantive rights to recover for injuries, including the elements of
damage that may be recovered? If the framers had any intention
to shield the substantive law of civil wrongs from any limiting
legislation, were they thinking only of substantive common law
(principally tort principles) as it existed in 1891? Section 241 expressly limits its protection to recoveries for death inflicted by

I Section 14 appeared as Article XII, section 13, in the 1792 constitution; as Article
X, section 13, in the 1799 constitution; and as Article XIII, section 15, in the 1850
constitution.
2 See, e.g., McCollum v. Sisters of Charity, 799 S.W.2d 15, 17 (Ky. 1990) ("We
hold that the five-year cap provided ... in the statute violates the open courts provisions
of the Kentucky Constitution. . ....
3 49 S.W.2d 347 (Ky. 1932).
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"negligence or wrongful act." The framers surely meant acts for
which there is a recognized cause of action. But did they mean "as
presently defined," or "as defined from time to time"? Also, did
they mean to include causes of action defined by the courts, by
the General Assembly, or both? Finally, does constitutional (legislative) history shed light on the probable answers to all or some
4
of these questions?
In Part I of this Article, a picture of the present structure of
jural rights is drawn from recent cases. In Part II, the structure is
analyzed in light of the constitutional history of the provisions that
provide its foundation. In Part III, a broader perspective is stated,
based in part on a comparative look at the laws of some other
states. Part IV considers jural rights in the context of calls for
"tort reform." Part V states a conclusion that the doctrine of
jural rights is founded on a misconception of constitutional history
and textual meaning, and should be abandoned.
I.

THE STRuCTURE OF JURAL RIGHTS

Ludwig v. Johnson5 is recognized by the Kentucky Supreme
Court as the "first definitive case ' 6 in which sections 54 and 241
were discussed in combination with section 14. In Ludwig, the
plaintiff had been injured while a passenger in the defendant's
automobile and sued for damages based on negligence. The defendant pleaded a recently enacted "guest statute" that barred recovery for a nonpaying passenger's injuries or death caused by a
driver's negligent conduct. 7 The court ruled the statute to be unconstitutional, finding that its bar of recovery for death violated
section 241, and that its bar of recovery for injuries violated
sections 14 and 54: "It was the manifest purpose of the framers
of [the constitution] to preserve and perpetuate the common law
right of a citizen injured by the negligent act of another to sue to
recover damages for his injury.'' 8
On an important point, the opinion is ambiguous. The court's
discussion on the merits opened with the observation that "[p]rior
4 The Kentucky Supreme Court has provided answers to most of the above questions,
though without probing deeply into the last one, regarding background constitutional history

such as the sources of the provisions and any debate about them by the delegates to the
1891 constitutional convention.
5 49 S.W.2d 347 (Ky. 1932).
6 Perkins v. Northeastern Log Homes, 808 S.W.2d 809, 815 (Ky. 1991).
See Ludwig, 49 S.W.2d at 348.
*-Id. at 351.
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to the enactment of the 'guest statute,' the rule was well settled in
this state that the driver of an automobile owed an invited guest

the duty of exercising ordinary care." 9 But in interpreting section
14, which received more attention than the other sections, the court
relied on and quoted from an Oregon case that had found a guest

statute to be unconstitutional under Oregon's constitutional equivalent of section 14: 'The purpose of this provision is to save from
legislative abolishment those jural rights which had become well

establishedprior to the enactment of our Constitution."'10
In subsequent Kentucky cases, until Saylor v. Hall" was decided
in 1973, Ludwig came to stand for the proposition that the open
courts provisions protected from legislative diminution or abolition
those jural rights that were established when the constitution was

ratified in 1891.12 In Saylor, Chief Justice Reed introduced what
turned out to be a slow motion but otherwise brief game of judicial
serve and volley. The court was confronted with 1966 legislation
that established a five year period within which an action could be

brought against a builder for personal injuries or death arising out
of "deficiency" in the design or construction of any improvement
to real property. 3 The time period was to run from "substantial
completion" of a structure. Defendant builder had completed construction of a house in 1955, which he sold that same year. Tenants
of the buyer took possession of the house in 1969, and within a

few months a stone fireplace collapsed, killing one and injuring
another of the tenants' children. A suit by the tenants against the

4
builder had been dismissed below as time-barred under the statute.'

9 1d. at 348-49 (emphasis added).
,0 Id. at 350 (emphasis added) (quoting Stewart v. Houk, 271 P. 998, 999 (Or. 1928)).
The court turned to the Oregon case after distinguishing cases from several other states
with section 14 equivalents, where guest statutes had been upheld. See id. (distinguishing
Silver v. Silver, 143 A. 240 (Conn. 1928), aff'd on other grounds, 280 U.S. 117 (1929);
Siesseger v. Puth, 234 N.W. 540 (Iowa 1931); Sorrell v. White, 153 A. 359 (Vt. 1931)).
Oregon subsequently abandoned the position that jural rights are substantively protected by
its open courts provision. See infra notes 122-123 and accompanying text.
" 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973).
12 See, e.g., Happy v. Erwin, 330 S.W.2d 412, 413-14 (Ky. 1959) ("In holding such
act unconstitutional, it was pointed out that the objective of section 14 was to preserve
those jural rights which had become well established prior to the adoption of the Constitution." (citing Ludwig, 49 S.W.2d at 350)).
11See Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218, 219-20 (Ky. 1973) (addressing Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 413.135 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1966) [hereinafter KRS]).
14See Saylor, 497 S.W.2d at 220.
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On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals15 noted that if the
tenants would otherwise have a cause of action against the builder
for negligent construction the challenged legislation would cut off
that cause of action before it could have arisen, because injury
was a necessary element of the cause. Injury had occurred some
fourteen years after completion of the structure. Thus the legislation, cast as a statute of limitations, was actually a statute of
"repose." Chief Justice Reed determined that the legislation violated "the spirit and language of Sections 14, 54, and 241 of the
Constitution of Kentucky when read together.' 1 6 He stated this
conclusion, however, only after responding in his characteristically
learned way to the issue posed by the position of the defendant.
He described defense counsel's position as "tacitly" admitting that
the General Assembly has no power to extinguish a common law
right of action for negligence, unless no such right of action existed
when the General Assembly acted. The determining issue, then,
was whether, under the common law of Kentucky as it existed
prior to enactment of the legislation, a third party injured by a
17
builder's deficient construction could recover against the builder.
The Chief Justice determined that the court had abandoned the
old privity of contract rule in 1956 and had adopted the position
stated in section 395 of the Restatement of Torts, which allowed
8
an action such as the one presented.
About nine years later, Chief Justice Palmore wrote an opinion
for the court in Carney v. Moody, 9 holding that the statute of
repose at issue in Saylor could be validly applied to block an action
not distinguishable from the one involved in Saylor.2 0 In a brief
opinion, the Chief Justice explained that sections 14 and 54 protect
only those rights of action for injuries that were recognized at
common law when the constitution was enacted. Because third
parties had no cause of action against builders for building defects
in 1891, the General Assembly's power was not limited by those
provisions of the constitution.2 ' Saylor was not thought to be

11Prior to 1976, when Kentucky's Judicial Department was reconfigured by constitutional amendment, see KY. CoNsT. §§ 109-124, the Kentucky Court of Appeals was
Kentucky's court of last resort.
16 Saylor, 497 S.W.2d at 225.
'7 Id. at 221.
11See id. at 223-24. Restatement of Torts, section 395 is now contained in section
385 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
19646 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1982).
See Carney v. Moody, 646 S.W.2d 40, 40 (Ky. 1982).
21See id. at 41.
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authority for a contrary result because of the narrow issue that
had been presented and addressed in that case. Writing for a
unanimous court, Chief Justice Palmore specifically rejected an
equation between jural rights and an evolving common law, for
that would lead to the unacceptable result that "every enlargement
in ... liability for negligent conduct ... would assume constitu.tional status," 22
This ruling was soon challenged, but a differently composed
Supreme Court took a different tack. In Tabler v. Wallace,23
Justice Leibson wrote an opinion striking application of the no
action statute, but on the ground that it constituted "special legislation" in violation of section 59(5) of the constitution. 24 Section
59 forbids "local and special" legislation generally, and specifically
with respect to twenty-nine listed subjects. The fifth listed subject
is "To regulate the limitation of civil or criminal actions." Because
manufacturers and suppliers of products used in real estate improvements were not extended the time-based immunity extended
by the statute to designers and builders, and because, in the opinion
of the court, there was no reasonable basis for distinguishing one
group from the other, the legislation was impermissibly "special"
in nature.2
The General Assembly responded by revising the no action
legislation to encompass and protect suppliers and all others involved in real estate improvements. At the same time, it increased
the time bar from five to seven years. 26 These changes came before
the court in what is for now the capstone case of the series. In
Perkins v. Northeastern Log Homes,27 plaintiff claimed she suffered non-Hodgkins lymphoma caused by exposure to a wood
preservative used in a log home kit she and her husband had
purchased from the defendant manufacturer some nine years earlier.2s Seeking damages under theories of negligence and strict
liability "by reason of defective product," plaintiff joined the
defendants that allegedly designed and produced the wood preservative. 29 The case was before the court on the basis of two questions
2 Id.
- 704 S.W.2d 179 (Ky. 1985). This case involved a wrongful death action that was
brought for injuries sustained by an employee engaged in elevator maintenance.
See Tabler v. Wallace, 704 S.W.2d 179, 183 (Ky. 1985).
See id.at 185-88.
See KRS § 413.135 (repealed and reenacted 1990).
- 808 S.W.2d 809 (Ky. 1991).
See id.at 810-11.
See id.at 811.
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of law certified by the Federal District Court for the Western
District of Kentucky.
The first question was whether Kentucky's amended no action
statute violated sections 14, 54, 59, and/or 241. Justice Leibson
again wrote for the court, and this time he sought to close any
door that earlier had been left ajar. He ruled that the statute
violated all of the referenced sections. 0 It violated section 59 as
special legislation, because now it protected manufacturers and
suppliers when their products were used in real estate improvement,
but not when the same products were used as chattels or component
parts of durable goods, without any reasonable basis for the distinction." The statute violated the "open courts" provisions, because those provisions protect the generic
jural right to sue for personal injury or death caused by
negligence or other wrongful acts....
... In drafting our constitutional protections in sections 14,
54, and 241, our founding fathers were protecting the jural rights
of the individual citizens of Kentucky . . ., speaking to their
rights as they would be commonly understood by those citizens

in any year, not just in

1891.32
33

Carney v. Moody was overruled.
Four scenarios for which recoveries were unknown in 1891 are
for now securely housed in the court's "open courts" structure as
a result of the Perkins opinion. 34 Justice Leibson noted that the
Ludwig court had protected general negligence actions arising out
of use of the automobile, a fact situation that would not have
occurred in 1891. 31 He completely rehabilitated and endorsed the
Saylor case, which had constitutionalized the judiciary's post-1891
abandonment of the privity doctrine, a move that had tremendously
expanded prior conceptions of the scope of duty under negligence
law. Justice Leibson then rationalized protection of the judicially

30See id. at 817.
3

See id. at 814.

31 Id. at 816.
33 See id. at 817.

Because the Perkins opinion covers so much ground, it will be referenced repeatedly
in the course of this Article. My criticism of the case, right or wrong, must not be understood
as any disparagement of the talents of its author. Justice Leibson is exceptionally able and
articulate. His opinions are carefully constructed and show that he has a clear sense of his
direction.
31 See Perkins, 808 S.W.2d at 815-16.
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created doctrine of strict liability from any restriction by the legislature:
We do not agree that ... the cause of action ... based on
liability in tort for a defective product, can be abolished at will
by the General Assembly. Liability in tort for a defective product

is not 'liability without fault,' as mistakenly stated in Fireman's
Fund Ins. v. Gov't Employees Ins., Co. It is simply liability for

negligent conduct as that concept has evolved over the last forty
years. Nichols v. Union Underwear, the landmark case on the
subject, explains that '[t]he strict liability standard is no different
from that of negligence, they say, except that the seller is presumed to have knowledge of the actual condition of the product

when it leaves his hands.' Product liability law is nothing more
than the continuing historic evolution of the ancient cause of
Both [products liability and
action for trespass on the case ....
negligence] theories are based on a finding of fault and there is

no reason to deny the protection of sections 14, 54, and 241 to
one or the other.3 6
Finally, answering the federal court's second certified question
in Perkins, the court stated a spacious "discovery" rule. The
question put was whether the statute of limitations in a latent
disease case runs from the time the plaintiff knows or should have
discovered the disease.37 The court answered that it runs from the
time the plaintiff knew or should have discovered not only the fact
of injury, "but also that the injury may have been caused by the
defendant's conduct.''38 Justice Leibson recognized that the evolution of "judicial doctrine" to include discovery rules is "as much
' '39
of recent origin as the fall of the citadel of privity.
This last point has implications more far reaching than even
the idea that the framers in 1891 intended to delegate power to the
judiciary to constitutionalize a concept they never dreamed of,
such as strict liability in tort for "defective" products. Strict liability is an evolutionary product of the common law. But discovery
rules are the evolutionary product of statutory interpretation. Statutes of limitation are customarily worded in terms of time periods
that run from the time a cause of action "accrued." For most of
the history of law, a cause of action was deemed to accrue, within
Id. at 816 (emphasis added).
11See id. at 810.
33 Id. at 819.
39 Id. at 817.
36
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the meaning of such a statute, at the point when a wrong produced
an injury. Kentucky was no exception to this history. 4° This sometimes produced anomalous results, for if a patient's below-standard
surgery caused injury, but she did not realize symptoms until more
than a year had elapsed from the operation, her claim by then was
barred. She suffered the injury at the time of the surgery, and in
logic she had a cause of action at that moment.
The Kentucky court was not moved to adopt a discovery rule
until 1970, in Tomlinson v. Siehl,41 a medical malpractice case.
The court recognized that it "has always been the rule in this state
that causes of action such as the present one 'accrue' on the date
of the operation." 42 But the court then overruled a long line of
cases, including Carter,43 standing for that proposition and held
that the statute of limitations should run from the time an injury
is discovered. 44 In announcing this rule, the court was not merely
evolving the common law; it was reinterpreting long standing stat45
utory language.
Specifically responding to Tomlinson,46 the General Assembly
rewrote the statute of limitations to measure a medical malpractice
cause of action from the time "the injury is first discovered or in
the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered," 47 but
it coupled this with an outside limitation of five years from the
time the alleged negligent act occurred. 48 This statute was substantially more generous than the previous one, as interpreted by the
court up to 1970. Nevertheless, in McCollum v. Sisters of Charity,49
the court struck down the five-year limitation as a statute of repose,
thus constitutionalizing a discovery rule as an ingredient of the
statutory word "accrued." Even so, the court specifically held that
a cause of action would "accrue" from discovery of injury, not

I

See, e.g., Carter v. Harlan Hosp. Ass'n, 97 S.W.2d 9, 10 (Ky. 1936).

459 S.W.2d 166 (Ky. 1970).
v. Siehl, 459 S.W.2d 166, 167 (Ky. 1970).
41 Carter v. Harlan Hosp. Ass'n, 97 S.W.2d 9 (Ky. 1936).
"See id.
"1

42 Tomlinson

15

KRS § 413.140(1)(e) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1970) at that time contained the standard

reference to "after the cause of action accrued."
46 See Perkins, 808 S.W.2d at 817 ("The object of this statute was, of course, to
avoid the 'discovery rule' of Tomlinson v. Siehl....").
4 KRS § 413.140(1)(e), (2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1972).
a See id.
19799 S.W.2d 15 (Ky. 1990).

KENTUCKY LAW JOUrRNAL

[VOL. 80

from the time one might connect known injury to specific past
50
wrongful conduct.
With this background, the court's formulation of a new and
more spacious discovery rule in Perkins takes on added meaning.
The General Assembly had not added even a qualified discovery
rule to the general statute of limitations governing suits against
builders and suppliers for personal injuries. 5' Moreover, the General Assembly's initial attempt to place a five-year limit on such
52
actions predated the court's 1970 adoption of a discovery rule. It
was in this context that Justice Leibson stated the Perkins rule,
not only putting a gloss on the General Assembly's "accrued" by
adding the idea of discovery of injury, but also adding a layerdiscovery that injury may have been caused by wrongful act-that
the court had specifically rejected in McCollum only a year earlier.
It is hard to know where the above approach (which includes
rejecting legislative efforts to modify judicial modifications of previously accepted legislation) may lead, but even without that wrinkle, the court's interpretation of the open courts provisions has
extraordinarily broad implications. The provisions have now been
enlisted in cases narrowing "sovereign" immunity.53 Their application is the subject of ongoing debate in cases involving multiple
tortfeasors and such judicially created concepts as indemnity and
apportionment, and choices between those concepts and the statutorily created concept of contribution, though disputes between
multiple defendants in this context are not claims for injuries to
persons or property.5 4 Kentucky's blood shield law, which in com-

See McCollum v. Sisters of Charity, 799 S.W.2d 15, 19 (Ky. 1990). Chief Justice
Stephens wrote the opinion. He applied the still intact Carney formulation, but found that
medical malpractice actions predated 1891. See id. at 18-19. One might object that it was
necessary to apply a post-1891 discovery rule to characterize the legislation as a statute of
repose, and that the legislature's discovery rule should have fallen with its clearly integral
five-year limitation. It is not clear from the opinion whether the source of the discovery
rule was the legislation or the court's then 20-year old interpretation of earlier legislation
in Tomlinson v. Siehl.
51See KRS § 413.140(1)(a) (stating that the cause of action "shall be commenced
within one (1) year after the cause of action accrued"). KRS § 413.135 added the five, later
enlarged to seven-year limitation for this category of actions.
52 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
13 In Kentucky Center for the Arts v. Berns, 801 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Ky. 1991), the
court, per Justice Leibson, said: "But the General Assembly has no power to extend
sovereign immunity beyond the limits of the area constitutionally protected by section 231
[relating to suits against the Commonwealth]. When it attempts to do so, it is in violation
of the rights preserved to our citizens under sections 14, 54, and 241."
"The issues in this complex area are explored in a 1991 student paper on file in the
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mon with some forty-seven other states' laws characterizes supplying blood as providing a service rather than a product, may now
be in greater jeopardy. Perkins overruled the cases recently relied
on by the Sixth Circuit to uphold Kentucky's law against attack
under the open courts provisions. 5 Presumably the court's adoption of comparative negligence in Hilen v. Hays,5 6 as well as the
evolving details of its judicial administration, is constitutionalized.
I leave it to the reader to fill in the blanks of prognostication that
are projected by two sentences, in context, in Perkins: 'Surely
then, [legislative destruction of] a cause of action before it legally
exists cannot be permissible if it accomplishes destruction of a
constitutionally protected right of action," 5 7 and "Kentucky Constitution section 54 prohibits the General Assembly from enacting
any 'restriction on recovery for injury or death."'58
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS

It is no part of my present purpose to defend or attack the
merits of specific efforts by the General Assembly to modify Kentucky's common law of torts, though it may be noted that the
General Assembly has not acted in a vacuum but has in most
instances reflected national trends. Nor is it my purpose to analyze
the merits of the rules and ideas, as tort principles, applied by the
court in the above summarized cases. Under the court's current
interpretation of the open courts provisions, tort principles will be
whatever the court decides they shall be; the merits or demerits of
efforts by the General Assembly to modify those principles are
irrelevant because it has no voice in the matter.
It is my purpose to show that these constitutional provisions
do not mean what they have been assumed to mean. The starting
place is an understanding of the remarkable nature of the jural
rights structure (even in its formerly confined state) the court has

University of Kentucky Law Library. See Sandra Turner, Protecting the Guilty? The Role
of Indemnity in Workers' Compensation Litigation-The Questionable Constitutionality of
KRS 342.690.
1s See McKee v. Cutter Labs., Inc., 866 F.2d 219 (6th Cir. 1989). The Sixth Circuit
relied on Carney v. Moody, which was overruled in Perkins. See supra note 33 and
accompanying text. The origin and history of blood shield laws, and an analysis of the
constitutionality of Kentucky's law are developed in a 1991 student paper on file in the
University of Kentucky Law Library. See Susan Sears, The Constitutionality of Kentucky's
Blood Shield Statute: Post Perkins v. Northeastern Log Homes.
673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984).
- Perkins, 808 S.W.2d at 812 (quoting Saylor, 497 S.W.2d at 224).
58Id. at 814.
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recognized. Acting in what otherwise would simply be the common
law tradition, the Kentucky Supreme Court writes constitutional
law in every tort case, and new constitutional law every time it
breaks new ground. As a result of Perkins v. Northeastern Log
Homes,59 for example, section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, dealing with strict liability for defective products,6 has
constitutional force in Kentucky. At least this is true to the extent
that the court has bought into the Restatement, and that is to a
very large extent indeed. The idea that a court in the mere exercise
of the common law tradition should be empowered to speak with
constitutional authority that is beyond the modifying powers of
the legislative branch represents a dramatic break with 800 years
of history under the common law. The sources that are claimed to
justify that break must be evaluated in light of the magnitude and
unprecedented nature of the claimed result.
It is probable that the court string cites the open courts provisions, frequently referring to their meaning in "spirit" and "language" when "read together, ' 61 because it concludes that separately
the provisions are vulnerable to much narrower meanings. In combination, the role of section 14 is to guarantee a remedy for injury;
the role of section 54 is to protect the remedy from diminution
below what the court has deemed to be just; and the role of section
241 is to guarantee a remedy when injury results in death. Thus
combined, the provisions appear as the legs of a tripod carefully
constructed by our "founding fathers" to support a delegation of
absolute power to the courts. History shows that nothing could be
further removed from reality.
A.

Section 14

This section has nothing to add to, but a great deal to subtract
from, the court's conception of jural rights. It was noted above
that section 14 was included in Kentucky's first constitution, which
was enacted in 1792. The provision is considerably older than our
commonwealth, however, and finds expression in many other state
constitutions. This is because it is the tap root of the English and
our common law system, central to which is the idea that common

59808 S.W.2d 809 (Ky. 1991). For a discussion of Perkins, see supra notes 27-39, 51/58 and accompanying text.
See RESTATEMENT

(SEcoND) OF TORTS §

402A (1965).

1,See, e.g., Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218, 224-25 (Ky. 1973).
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law courts resolve disputes, creating precedents, and thus law, in
the absence of governing legislation but subject to modification by
the people through their elected representatives. Some scholars
trace the earliest foundations of the common law back to the reign
of King Henry II (1154-89). 62 Section 14 is drawn from Magna
Charta, signed by King John in 1215 and reissued by subsequent
early Kings. 63
There is no doubt that the framers of Kentucky's 1792 and
1891 constitutions understood the derivation of the language of
section 14. Delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1890
explained at length that section 14 is derived from chapter 29 of
Magna Charta." Chapter 29 is a combination of paragraphs 39
and 40 of the Magna Charta of 1215.65 Section 14 is more elaborate
than paragraph 40, to which it traces ("To no one will we sell, to
no one will we deny or delay right or justice"), but listen to
Blackstone in his Commentaries on the Law of England:
A third subordinate right [those rights necessary to the enjoyment
of basic rights of personal security, liberty, and property] of
every Englishman is that of applying to the courts of justice for
redress of injuries. Since the law is in England the supreme arbiter
62 See, e.g., CARL STEPH NsoN & FREDERICK G. MARCHAM, SouRc.s OF ENGLISH
CONSTTrnToNAL HISTORY 71 (1937). As a reproduction of original documents, this work is
timeless. See also 2 Wn.uIAm HoLDswoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 12 (1923).
6 STEmHNSON & MARCHAM, supra note 62, at 115.

" Consider, for example, the comments of delegate Robert Rodes:
But looking at that Magna Charta, there are but two sections in it particularly
interesting to one at this time-one is the twenty-ninth section, and the other
the twenty-sixth. There is not a Committee in this body which has read this

provision in the twenty-ninth chapter ... that has not felt that he heard the
bass drum of centuries sounding in his ears. How does the thirteenth section
[later renumbered 14] of our Bill read: "The Commonwealth of Kentucky
says to all her citizens that the doors of her Courts are always open, and any
person who has received an injury in his lands, goods, estate, person or
reputation, let him enter and he shall have a remedy by due course of law
without denial, sale or delay." That is the language, and that is the proposition, the only important part of Magna Charta; the residue referring to details
which have long since passed....
I OFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION ASSEMBLED AT
FRANKFORT, ON THE EIGHTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 1890, TO ADOPT, AMEND, OR CHANGE THE
CONSTITUTON OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY 444 [hereinafter DEBATES, CONST. CONVENTION
OF 1890].
61 As set forth in KRS, vol. 1, Chapter XXIX, Magna Charta, reads as follows: "No
freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised of his freehold, or liberties, or free
customs, or be outlawed or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him,
nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land. We will
sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man, either justice or right."
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of every man's life, liberty, and property, courts of justice must
at all times be open to the subject, and the law be duly administered therein. The emphatical words of magna carta, spoken in
the person of the king, who in judgment of law (says Sir Edward
Coke) is ever present and repeating them in all his courts, are
these; [Latin rendition omitted] "and therefore every subject,"
continues the same learned author, "for injury done to him in
bonis, in terris, vel persona, by any other subject, be he ecclesiastical or temporal without any exception, may take his remedy
by the course of the law, and have justice and right for the injury
done to him, freely without sale, fully without any denial, and
speedily, without delay." It were endless to enumerate all the
affirmative acts of parliament, wherein justice is directed to be
done according to the law of the land; and what that law is,
every subject knows; or may know if he pleases; for it depends
not upon the arbitrary will of any judge; but is permanent, fixed,
and unchangeable, unless by authority of parliament....
Not only the substantial part, or judicial decisions, of the
law, but also the formal part, or method of proceeding, cannot
be altered but by parliament ....
The source and nature of Section 14 are unmistakable. It is a
guarantee of process in the application of the law of the landdue course of law. It is not, nor could it sensibly be, a delegation
of final authority to the courts to declare substantive law through
the law of remedies. Section 14 addresses much more than the law
of torts. To countenance a delegation of so broad a power to the
courts, drawn from language that when first written could have
aptly been styled an "Opening of the Courts" provision, defies
imagination and history.6 7
Kentucky's highest court understood this concept well at an
earlier time. An argument of constitutional jural rights bottomed
on article 13, section 15 of the 1850 constitution (now section 14)

61 WrLAM BLAcKsToNE, COMMENTARIES

*141-42.

67I should emphasize that Blackstone is not quoted here for enlightenment on sub-

stantive matters such as the early law of torts or contract. The English law in his era might
or might not have bearing on those subjects in specific contexts in 1992. He is referenced
for his description of a methodology, the provision of a system for resolving disputes and
implementing the law, that was 500 years old when he spoke. He published his remarks
only 17 years before Kentucky's 1792 constitution was written. What he and Kentucky's
1792 document said, because it was not substantive but procedural, is as pertinent today as
it was in 1215. As for 1891, it is instructive to compare delegate Rodes's reference to the
Commonwealth speaking to its citizens, see supra note 64, with Blackstone's reference to
the King speaking to his subjects.
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was made to the court in Johnson v. Higgins." The court responded:
It prescribes certain general duties for the courts of the State
•.. the effect of which may be thus stated: They are to be held
in an open and public manner, and their proceedings are not to
be secret or concealed from public view. 2. They are to administer
justice without sale-that is, they are not to accept compensation
from litigants; and 3. They are not to deny any one a fair trial,
nor to delay the same, except upon sufficient legal grounds for
continuance.
The terms and import of this provision show that it relates
altogether to the judicial department ... which is to administer
justice "by due course of law," and not to the legislative department, by which such "due course of law" may be prescribed.
Any other construction would make it inconsistent with other
clauses 69of the constitution, and, in fact, render it practically
absurd.
This was the law when the 1890 Convention opened.
If the framers in carrying forward the language of section 14
intended to depart from centuries of history, and Johnson v.
Higgins's confirmation of its settled meaning in Kentucky, one
would expect the record to fairly shout out that intent. The record
is silent. Nothing in the record of the convention even hints of any
purpose to change the application or established meaning of section
14. The report of the proceedings of the 1890 convention, which I
will subsequently refer to in the text as the Debates, occupies over
6000 pages in four volumes of double-columned small print. The
volumes are not well-indexed, so a search for information most
often involves a great deal of scanning. Section 14 is one of 26
sections regarded as the Bill of Rights. The delegates discussed and
debated the Bill of Rights directly for some 600 pages in the
Debates.7 0 I found no evidence whatsoever in these pages of any
intention but to carry forward section 14 as a reiteration of its
counterpart sections in the previous three constitutions.
The delegates moved through the Bill of Rights, offering their
comments, section by section. The early comment of delegate Robert Rodes of Warren County, presenting the report of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, is representative. After reciting the

" 60 Ky. (3 Met.) 566 (1861).
69 Johnson v. Higgins, 60 Ky. (3 Met.) 566, 570-71 (1861).
10See 1 DEATEs, CONST. CoNvrNTIo oF 1890, supra note 64, at 432-1045.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[VOL.. 80

language of section 14, he said, "That is unobjected to, and is the
equivalent of section 15 of the present Constitution.'' 7 1 Except for
his and others' occasional encomiums to Magna Charta, with references to the contributions of Sir Edward Coke, this comment
reflects the essence of the debate as it concerned section 14.
B.

Section 54

In Perkins, Justice Leibson aptly summarized a principal thrust
of the 1890 Convention:
"Most of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention felt that
the real root of Kentucky's governmental problems was the almost
unlimited power of the General Assembly. One of them even said
that '. . . the principal, if not the sole purpose of the constitution
which we are here to frame, is to restrain its [the Legislature's]
will and restrict its authority. . . .' They distrusted the General
Assembly, so they wrote many details of law into the Constitution." 72
Indeed they did. The delegates' heightened concern with the power
of corporations, especially of railroad corporations, in relation to
the legislative branch is evident throughout the Debates. They were
also legitimately concerned with the incredible extent to which the
General Assembly enacted "special legislation." Section 54, introduced initially as section 39 of the provisions bearing on the
legislative department, reflects these concerns. Delegate I. A. Spalding presented the report of the Committee, explaining each recommendation, section by section. He explained a "new" section
39:
The Legislature has, perhaps, in some cases, put a limit upon
the amount to be recovered for damages by railroad accidents to
persons resulting in death or in injury to persons or property.
This section forbids the General Assembly from putting any limit
upon the amount to be recovered, leaving it to the jury.73
It is not a grudging interpretation of this language to suggest
that it means that where the general law provides a cause of action
for the recovery of damages for injuries to person or property, the
1 id. at 439.
Perkins, 808 S.W.2d at 812 (quoting LErIsLAnrvE RESEARCH CoM'N, RESEARCH
REPORT No. 137, at 161 (1987)).
71 3 DEBATES,
CONST. CONVENTION OF 1890, supra note 64, at 3793.
71

72
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General Assembly may not specify dollar limits for specially selected defendants, but must leave the determination of damages to
the fact finder. Neither the language of section 54 nor Spalding's
explanation of its purpose says anything about the elements of
recovery or the standards by which given elements will be measured. References are to "the amount to be recovered." Considering
proper elements and measures in light of the facts, a judge or jury
determines the amount to be recovered, stated in dollars. Such an
interpretation would provide important protection from the feared
excesses of the legislature, without harming enduring values. The
delegates clearly saw the provision as quite limited and harmless
in its purpose and effect, for so far as I have been able to discover,
delegate Spalding's language of explanation as quoted above represents the entire legislative history of section 54.
The delegates debated the block of legislative provisions over
the space of about 353 pages, following the typical approach of
discussing them in order, frequently offering amendments, quarreling with phraseology, etc. The section immediately preceding
original section 39 was a provision that would disqualify any officer
or attorney for a railroad from service in the General Assembly.
This provision was debated over the space of about 18 pages and
amendment after amendment was offered, including one that would
disqualify from the General Assembly anyone that had "traveled
on the road of any railroad two years previous to his election." 74
At the conclusion of that debate, section 39, containing the language that eventually emerged as section 54 of the constitution,
was read. The clerk announced there were motions by three delegates to strike the section; one of these delegates then withdrew
his motion, without comment; a vote was taken and the "amendment" was rejected. A further vote was then taken and the section
was adopted. 75 Not a line of discussion is reported, and I have
found none anywhere else in the record of the Convention. The
record shows that the delegates were alert and quite ready and
willing to debate matters of any substance at all at considerable
length. Given their apparent yawn in response to the introduction
of section 54, its adoption is simply not the stuff of which to make
a reversal of 800 years of western thinking about how to organize
governments.
1,3 id. at 3898-916. The amendment described in the text is at 3900. This section,
originally numbered 38, was renumbered 37 by the time it was debated.
11See 3 id. at 3916. Section 39 had by then been renumbered 38.
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A curious word in context, delegate Spalding's "perhaps. ' ' 76 It
is probably explained by circumstantial evidence that convincingly
indicates reliance was placed, not on Kentucky's experience, but
on Pennsylvania's.77 Article III, section 21 of Pennsylvania's 1874

constitution introduced the same concept as section 54, in virtually
identical language. It went further to assure that in case of death
from personal injuries, the right of action "shall survive. ' 7 8 An
annotation to this section of Pennsylvania's constitution collects
eleven cases in the 1880s, right up to 1889, all against railroad
companies, under the note: "This clause avoided existing laws
limiting the amount of recovery for injuries.

' 79

The existing law

that was avoided was an 1868 Act that established maximum dollar
amounts that could be recovered for negligent injury. 0 References
to Pennsylvania's constitution are scattered throughout the Debates, and at least on one occasion delegate William Goebel read
a provision of that constitution to the delegates.8 '
C. Section 241
Delegate Goebel explained this "new section" during consideration of the General Provisions of the draft constitution.12 It
secured the survival of action result just noted in Pennsylvania's
constitution. Goebel explained that a statute allowing recovery for
wrongful death had been interpreted by Kentucky's court to allow
recovery only to a widow, husband or child. He said he had twice

76For the complete quote, see supra text accompanying note 73.
- Kentucky cases bracketing 1891 employ common law standards in evaluating damage
awards for personal injuries and contain no references to existing legislation touching the
subject. See, e.g., Louisville & N.R.R. v. Greer, 29 S.W. 337 (Ky. 1895) (allowing plaintiff
to recover punitive damages); Central Passenger R.R. v. Kuhn, 6 S.W. 441, 446-47 (Ky.
1888) (discussing general legislation, passed in 1839, regarding joint and several liability in
actions of trespass).

,8 Pennsylvania's 1874 constitution provided in pertinent part: "No act of the General
Assembly shall limit the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for
injuries to persons or property; and, in case of death from such injuries, the right of action
shall survive, and the General Assembly shall prescribe for whose benefit such actions shall
be prosecuted." PA. CONST. art. III, § 21. This language was amended in 1915 to expressly
allow workers' compensation legislation, and was slightly rephrased and renumbered as
section 18 in 1967 amendments. The language quoted above remains essentially intact.
7' PA. CoNsr. art. 3, § 18 annot., in PA. STAT. ANN. (1969). Modem Pennsylvania
cases will be discussed infra in Part III.

80See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
" 4 DEBATES, CONSr. CoNY. op 1890, supra note 64, at 4724; see also infra note 94
and accompanying text.
12 4 id. at 4686-87. At this point in the debate, section 241 was called section 16.
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introduced bills to broaden the statute, but railroad lobbies defeated his attempts. So, those attempts having failed, he thought
the subject was "eminently proper" for inclusion in the constitution. He continued, "It will be observed that we simply seek to
extend to the personal representative the right of recovery, the
cause of action that the deceased would have if death had not
resulted."83

Section 241 stimulated some debate when its turn for discussion
arrived. One delegate offered an amendment that would restrict
recovery to a surviving spouse, child, parent, or sibling. This was
resisted by a delegate who spoke of the dependency of his grandchildren.84 Another thought the rule of the provision was sound,
and one he would vote for as a member of the legislature, but that
it was not the business of a constitution to correct a few years of
neglect by the legislature. He noted in this connection that when a
more important issue of legislative neglect had been under consideration-the matter of women's property rights-it was determined
that complete relief could be afforded by the legislature. 85 Delegate
Goebel defended inclusion of the provision in the constitution,
saying, "Of course it is legislation but when, after repeated attempts by surreptitious means, the action recommended by the
Court of Appeals [to seek an amendment to legislation the court
had interpreted] is prevented, I should say it is a proper thing for
the Convention to take the matter in hand and permanently correct
the defect." ' 86 After discussing a few more details (Should they
specify "heirs" as those to whom recovery should run? Might
creditors be able to reach a recovery?), the language of section 241
as originally proposed was adopted. 87
The only additional debate on this section occurred during the
final days of the Convention. This debate is somewhat curious,
coming as it did after the people, voting in August 1891, had
ratified the constitution. The delegates reassembled after that vote
and appointed a "Revisory Committee" to clean up the draft that
had been ratified. 8 Many changes were made, including one in the
4 id. at 4687 (emphasis added).
See 4 id. at 4715-16.
See 4 id.at 4717.
4 id.
See 4 id.at 4720. At this time the section read: "Whenever the death of a person
shall result from an injury inflicted by negligence or wrongful act, and damages could have

been recovered for such injury, if death had not resulted therefrom, then, in like manner
and in every such case, damages may be recovered for such death.. .

8 See 4 id.at 5651.

."

4 id. at 4715.
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language of section 241. When originally introduced by Goebel,
the section tracked his explanation, but it made no reference to
any specific defendant. It was in this originalform that section
241 (then numbered 250) was submitted to the people.8 9 On September 11, 1891, a subcommittee consisting of Goebel and another
delegate recommended changing the language of 241 to its present
form. This stimulated some debate that centered entirely on whether
the new reference to potential corporate defendants was clear enough
to prevent any escape.9 That was the whole purpose of the change. 9'
The extremely narrow focus of section 241 is apparent. Neither
its language nor its history can justify giving it any broader effect
than to preserve a wrongful death action in circumstances where,
in the absence of death, a cause of action for injuries would have
been available.
I found no evidence that sections 14, 54, and 241 were ever
conceived as some sort of package. In fact, I was not able to find
evidence that any delegate ever stated any linkage between sections
54 and 241, or between either of them and section 14. However,
in closing this Part, there is at least one occasion of linkage that
should be described. Resisting a provision dealing with eminent
domain, delegate George Washington linked section 14 to that
concept. His point apparently was that the combination of section
13 ("nor shall ... property be taken or applied to public use

without... just compensation being previously made) and section
14 made a provision for additional protective remedial details

The language submitted to the people appears supra, in note 87.

90See 4 DEBATES, CONST. CONVENTION OF 1890, supra note 63, at 5749-52.
1,The enabling legislation for the Convention clearly stated that no constitution could
take effect until it was ratified by the people. See I id.at 4. When the Revisory Committee
was created after the people had voted, several delegates felt that it could and should have
no power beyond making grammatical and clerical changes. Whether or not this was thought

too obvious to need inclusion in a resolution, it appears that the authorizing resolution
lacked an express limitation to that effect. See 4 id. at 5642-70. It is sometimes said that
the constitution was "ratified" on September 28, 1891. See, e.g., Ken Gormley & Rhonda

G. Hartman, The Kentucky Bill of Rights: A Bicentennial Celebration, 80 Ky. L.J. 1, 2
(1991-92). The delegates signed the final revised draft on that date, but the people ratified
an earlier draft the preceding month. See 4 DEBATES, CoNsT. CoNvamioN OF 1890, supra
note 64, at 5638, 6016-23. In Miller v. Johnson, 18 S.W. 522 (Ky. 1892), the court of
appeals rejected a challenge to the legitimacy of the constitution grounded in a claim that
the Convention exceeded its authority by changing the draft that had been ratified by the
people. The court treated the issue essentially as a "political question."

The case, and the history of "Governor" William Goebel's later assassination are
discussed in Gerald R. Toner & Ellen Cox Call, Three Cases that Shaped Kentucky's
History, Ky.BENcH & BAR,Winter 1992, at 11.
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unnecessary. Washington seemed to think the common law bearing
on eminent domain was adequate and was guarded by section 14.92
Delegate J.F. Askew defended inclusion of the disputed provision,
and the exchange that followed is of interest:
Washington: "Do you mean to say that the General Assembly
can do any thing antagonistic to section thirteen of the Bill of
Rights?"

Askew: "No sir; I did not say that.... What I said was this,
and I repeat it, that for injuries done to person or property,
under the common law, we can recover; but I say that the
Legislature can repeal that." 93
Askew continued, defending the disputed provision on the merits: "[I]n addition to that, it has been construed by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, and we will not only have the Constitution
in conformity with what was approved of by the Pennsylvania
Constitutional Convention, but we will have the benefit of a construction put upon it by that Court."' 94 The provision appears as
section 242 of the Kentucky Constitution.
III.
A.

ADDrIToNAL PERSPECTIVES

General
In the course of justifying protection of "jural rights" as they

evolve from the pen of the judiciary, the court in Perkins v.
Northeastern Log Homes referred to "our founding fathers,"

95

and then likened its approach to constitutional interpretation to
that employed by the United States Supreme Court in Brown v.
Board of Education.96 Just as the Court in Brown felt that it
should consider public education in its 1954 rather than in its 1868
context, 97 so the Kentucky Supreme Court said that it must apply
the open courts provisions to "fundamental jural rights as presently
accepted in society, not frozen in time to the year 1891."98
This has a nice preemptive (who could argue with this?) ring
to it, but for several reasons it provides a skewed perspective. First,
See 4 DEBATES, CONST. CONVENTION OF 1890, supra note 64, at 4722-27.
"

4 id. at 4727.

4 id.
9' Perkins v. Northeastern Log Homes, 808 S.W.2d 809, 816 (Ky. 1991).
347 U.S. 483 (1954). For the court's analogy, see Perkins, 808 S.W.2d at 817.
See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954).

Perkins, 808 S.W.2d at 817.
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1891 was not one of those great moments in history in quite the
sense that we have come to regard the times of the creation of the
United States Constitution and its civil rights amendments following the Civil War. 99 The framers of the 1891 Kentucky Constitution
can be credited with some much needed accomplishments, such as
their attack on special legislation in the context that had developed
by that time, 100 and their provision for statewide responsibility for
a system of common public schools, 101 to name but two examples.
But much of what will endure is in the Bill of Rights, most of
which was carried over from truer "founding fathers." This includes section 14, which as a repository of due process is one of
the great ideas of western civilization. But Perkins's solemn reference to our founding fathers as a means of bolstering the court's
specific interpretation of sections 14, 54, and 241 has a false ring
to it, given the history of section 14, and the evidence of the
circumstances surrounding the births of sections 54 and 241.
Second, there is no doubt that the United States Constitution
commands equal protection of the laws. The meaning of that
command must be determined by some person or agency, and in
our system it has come to be understood that the proper agency is
the judiciary. Whether the Kentucky Constitution commits a structure of jural rights to the final authority of the judiciary must be
questioned. Equal protection'is a grand and now basic concept in
the country. Even grander and more basic is the guaranty of
security for persons, property, and liberty referred to by Blackstone
as the end to be served by an impartial system of courts.' 2 This is
the guaranty found in Kentucky's section 14. But it is trite to
observe that both personal and property rights must be defined.
Their precise dimensions will depend upon virtually the entire legal
regime of a society. Neither personal nor property rights can be

99Louisville lawyer Sheryl Snyder surely stated a widely shared viewpoint when he
recently noted: "[N]ext year ... we will celebrate the bicentennial of our statehood. This
year, the current Constitution of Kentucky was 100 years old, and that is not a cause for
celebration ....
[It] is a document drafted in fear-fear of the 1900's and modem society."
Sheryl G. Snyder, State Needs Hopeful Constitution, OWENSBORO MESSENoER INQUIRER,
Dec. 15, 1991, at 2E (Snyder is Chairman of the Kentucky Center for Public Issues, and

of its Constitutional Improvement Policy Council). Historian Thomas D. Clark briefly
describes the political and social climate in which the 1891 constitution was born in Thomas
D. Clark, Constitution-Makingin Kentucky in Retrospect, Ky. BENcHI & BAR, Winter 1992,
at 21.
" See KY. CONST. § 59.
101See KY. CONST. § 183.

112See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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made secure against the interaction of individuals without limits,
at any cost. Someone or some agency must decide what those limits
shall be. In exercising the English common law tradition, the
judiciary in this country has for centuries been in the forefront in
establishing the boundaries of protection for persons and property.
But their decisions have always been subject to modification by
the legislative branch in light of experience. That the judiciary
should be the final repository of policy making power in this regard
has never been elevated to the level of an idea, to say nothing of
a grand, or even a good idea.
Third, it follows from the context of legal history that the
strongest evidential support should be demanded in support of a
conclusion that jural rights, even as understood in 1891, were
deliberately committed to the final authority of the judiciary. That
support is lacking. If the court has been in error in this regard, it
seriously compounds the error to insist that the judiciary alone has
the authority to establish the scope of protected jural rights, dayto-day.
B. A Glance at Some Other States
At least thirty-one states have enacted statutes of repose covering the construction industry, and the court in Perkins recognized
that a majority of these states have upheld these statutes. 10 3 In a
passage comparing the constitutional provisions of other states with
Kentucky's constitution, without naming states or citing cases, the
court recognized that many states have constitutional provisions
equivalent to Kentucky's section 14; but "few" have additional
protections such as Kentucky's sections 54 and 241. Many have
other provisions that prohibit the exercise of "arbitrary power"
and guarantee equal protection, similar to sections 2 and 3 respectively of Kentucky's constitution, but "few" have additional protection against local and special legislation. "So far as we can
determine, none has anything like the combination of broad constitutional protection of individual rights vouchsafed by our 1891
Kentucky Constitution."104
103
See Perkins, 808 S.W.2d at 818. Cases reflecting "at least thirty-one jurisdictions,"
including Kentucky, in which KRS 413.135 and statutes similar to it have been challenged
are collected in Jayne Moore, Comment, Design for Challenge: The Kentucky Statute of
Repose for Improvements to Real Property, 73 Ky. L.J. 1143, 1144 n.6 (1984-85).

10,Perkins, 808 S.W.2d at 818.
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What role these other types of constitutional provisions might
have in Kentucky's open courts jural rights doctrine is not at all
clear. Of course, a given legislative modification of the common
law of torts might be "special legislation," or a violation of equal
protection, state or federal, or an exercise of arbitrary power. In
many other states, legislative responses during the last ten to twenty
years to a perceived crisis in tort litigation, especially medical
malpractice litigation, have been much more creative than simple
statutes of repose. These "corrective measures" have been promptly
challenged under a variety of state constitutional provisions, and
many have been invalidated, on a wide variety of grounds. These
include: judicial conceptions of separation of powers; rights to trial
by jury; prohibition of special legislation; substantive due process
under provisions equivalent to Kentucky's section 14; and equal
protection.105
To find a violation of any of the above concepts, a court must
analyze the merits of a legislative measure in light of its background
purposes and the precise effects it will have on the interests of
plaintiffs and defendants. The merits of the court's analysis should
be subject to scrutiny, for certainly not every legislative modification respecting one or another right of action established by the
common law of torts is ipso facto violative of some constitutional
provision, and specifically in Kentucky, of either section 2, 3, or
59 of the constitution. No court is that infallible in its development
of the common law. Under the jural rights doctrine, however, the
Kentucky Supreme Court is infallible. Any legislative abolition or
restriction of a common law right of recovery within the scope of
the jural rights doctrine is invalid.
Pennsylvania's constitution has all of the constitutional provisions noted in the survey of other states in Perkins, except a direct
equivalent of Kentucky's denial of the existence of "absolute and
° It is well recognized that the framers of Kenarbitrary power."s0

oS Cases in which successful state constitutional challenges have been mounted against
a variety of legislative modifications of the common law governing medical malpractice
litigation are collected in Richard C. Turrington, ConstitutionalLimitationson Tort Reform:
Have the State Courts PlacedInsurmountableObstacles in the Path of Legislative Responses
to the Perceived Liability Insurance Crisis?, 32 Vu.. L. Rnv. 1299, 1317-19 n.52 (1987).
The legislative measures addressed include fixed dollar caps on recovery, which have not
fared well in the states under traditional provisions found in Bills of Rights and which
might serve as an example of legislative action targeted by Kentucky's section 54.
116 "Absolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and property of freemen exists
nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest majority." Ky. CoNsr. § 2. This provision
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tucky's 1792 constitution borrowed heavily from those of the colonies, including Pennsylvania's 1790 constitution, copying the latter
document's Bill of Rights "almost verbatim." 10 7 This borrowed
language includes Kentucky's present section 14. I have earlier
referred to the circumstantial evidence pointing to the conclusion
that Kentucky's 1891 sections 54 and 241 were drawn from Pennsylvania's 1874 constitution.108
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has placed a construction on
its triumvirate of constitutional provisions that is altogether different from the Kentucky Supreme Court's jural rights doctrine. It
has done so on the basis of a consideration of the origins and
purposes of the provisions. In Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong
Cork Co.,' °9 the court upheld a twelve-year statute of repose governing improvements to real property, rejecting claims that it was
invalid as "special legislation";"10 a violation of the "due process"
clause (the court's description of Pennsylvania's open courts provision);"' or a violation of article 3, section 18 (Kentucky's sections
54 and 241).112 The court did not treat any of the above claims,
except the last, "summarily." It so disposed of that claim because
it seemed apparent that the provision was addressed to limitations
on recovery for an existing cause of action, not to the elimination
3
of a cause of action before it had "vested.""
These results were foreshadowed by Singer v. Sheppard,"4 where
the court dealt with a challenge to Pennsylvania's non-elective nofault law based on a claim that it unconstitutionally eliminated a
common law cause of action or reduced recoveries recognized at
common law." 5 With respect to article 1, section 11 (Kentucky's
section 14) the court first quoted from the United States Supreme
Court:

was carried forward from the 1850 constitution, and is a statement about all of government,
not just the legislative branch. In Pennsylvania's present 1874 constitution, the Magna

Charta open courts provision is article 1, § 11; its sections 54 and 241 equivalents are in
article 3, § 18; and its ban on "special" and "local" laws combines the concepts of
Kentucky's §§ 59 and 60 in article 3, § 32.

,o Gormley & Hartman, supra note 91, at 4.
' See supra notes 78-81, 94 and accompanying text.
11 382 A.2d 715 (Pa. 1978).

110See Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 108 A.2d 715, 718-20 (Pa. 1978).
"I See id. at 720.
,,2 See id. at 721.
11 See id.
14346 A.2d 897 (Pa. 1975).
- See Singer v. Sheppard, 346 A.2d 897, 900 (Pa. 1975).
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"A person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of
common law.... Rights of property which have been created by
the common law cannot be taken away without due process; but
the law itself, as a rule of conduct, may be changed at the will
... of

the legislature, unless prevented by constitutionallimita-

tions. Indeed, the great office of statutes is to remedy defects in
the common law ... and to adapt it to changes of time and
6
circumstances.""1

The court concluded that article 1, section 11 could be invoked
only with respect to a "legal injury." The provision did not prevent
the legislature from extinguishing a cause of action, thereby defin117
ing what was or was not a legal injury.
Concerning the challenge under Pennsylvania's article 3, section
18 (Kentucky's sections 54 and 241), the court observed:
As we have seen, however, Article III, Section 18, was drafted
and approved to invalidate the Act of April 4, 1868, and to
prevent the passage of similar legislation in the future. Certainly,
"the full scope and meaning of the section should be considered
... in the light of the evil intended to be remedied by its

adoption." The Act of April 4, 1868, placed absolute dollar
maximums on the damages recoverable by the negligently injured
8
plaintiff."
The court went on to explain that the no-fault approach eliminated
categories of claims altogether, rather than reducing amounts recoverable for recognized causes of action." 9
In the final analysis, Perkins's preservation of a cause of action
the General Assembly had sought to eliminate can rest on interpretation of only one of Kentucky's triumvirate of "open courts"
provisions. Section 241 is a dependent, not a parent provision. It
cannot supply or guarantee a cause of action for injuries; it can
only guarantee the survival of an action in case of death due to
injuries that would have been actionable in the absence of death.
We must look elsewhere for the sources of law that define what
injuries are actionable. Section 54 cannot supply or guarantee a
cause of action. It contains no frame of reference for determining
the existence or scope of causes of action. It too is a dependent

116Id. at 903 (emphasis added by the court) (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113,

134 (1876)).
"7 See id. at 903.
"' Id. at 901 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
"9 See id. at 901-02.
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provision, restricting legislative power to place certain limitations
on recoveries for injuries made actionable by other sources of law.
This leaves only section 14, which the court as much as recognized in Perkins, as evidenced by language earlier quoted in part
from the case: 'Surely then, the application of ... limitation
statutes ... to destroy a cause of action before it legally exists

cannot be permissible if it accomplishes destruction of a constitutionally protected right of action."" 20 That reference has to be an
interpretation of section 14. Thus, decisions in the many states that
have section 14, but not sections 54 and 241 equivalents, are not
irrelevant for comparison purposes.
Oregon is one of those states having only a section 14, and the
current interpretation placed on its section 14 equivalent is of some
interest because of the reliance placed on an earlier contrary Oregon
precedent in Kentucky's pivotal Ludwig v. Johnson.12' In Josephs
v. Burns, 22 the Oregon court upheld a ten-year statute of repose
applicable to any negligence action for injury to person or property,
saying that the open courts provision "was not intended to give
anyone a vested right in the law either statutory or common."- 3 I
have not surveyed all the remaining states, but I did briefly survey
the fourteen states that preceded Kentucky's admission to the Union. Of these fourteen, ten have open courts provisions equivalent
to Kentucky's section 14. I found no cases in which the courts of
these states had interpreted their open courts provision in quite the
way Kentucky's is interpreted. 24

120 Perkins, 808 S.W.2d at 814 (quoting Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218, 225 (Ky.
1978)).
-2149 S.W.2d 347 (Ky. 1932); see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
"2 491 P.2d 203 (Or. 1971).
I Josephs v. Burns, 491 P.2d 203, 207 (Or. 1971) (quoting Noonan v. City of
Portland, 88 P.2d 808, 822 (Or. 1938)).
114 1. Connecticut: Gentile v Altermati, 363 A.2d 1, 12-15 (Conn. 1975) (finding that
legislature may alter or abolish accepted common law principles, but if a right existed at
the adoption of the constitution, it may be abolished only if a "reasonable alternative,"
such as the no-fault auto law, is made available). 2. Delaware: Cheswold Volunteer Fire
Co., v. Lambertson Constr. Co., 489 A.2d 413, 417 (Del. Super. Ct. 1984) (holding that
legislature may change rule of conduct; statute of repose upheld). 3. Maryland: WhitingTurner Contracting Co. v. Coupard, 499 A.2d 178, 189 (Md. 1985) (upholding statute of
repose). 4. Massachusetts: Pinnick v. Cleary 271 N.E.2d 592, 599-60 (Mass. 1971) (finding
no violation because cause of action had not accrued before legislation was enacted). 5.
New Hampshire:Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980) (holding that statutes altering
or abolishing common law rights must be reasonable); cf. Heath v. Sears Roebuck & Co.,
464 A.2d 288, 298 (N.H. 1986) (concluding that statute of repose violated equal protection
values). 6. North Carolina: Bolick v. American Barmag Corp., 293 S.E.2d 415, 420-21
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JURAL RIGHTS AND "TORT REFORM"

Having decided to include forms of strict liability and a liberal
discovery rule in its jural rights structure, the court in Perkins v.
Northeastern Log Homes expressed comfort with the rightness of
its position: "If [this] places us in a statistical minority, we can
only commiserate with the citizens of other states who do not enjoy
similar protection." '2 That protection is the jural rights structure,
which within its scope empowers the court alone to make any
meaningful changes in the status quo of tort litigation. The General
Assembly can expand liabilities, but it cannot for any reason
authoritatively subtract from the quantum and measures of liability
established by the court.
Justice Leibson spoke of the enforcement of the body of jural
26
rights-the common law-as "presently accepted in society."'
Who are the referents of that sentence, and how might we measure
their acceptance? The remark was made, after all, in the course of
striking legislation that had emerged from the democratic process.
Remembering that for every plaintiff there must be a defendant,
we might measure or guess about public reaction to specific lines
of cases. The specific results in Perkins surely appeal to our sense
of justice if we may take plaintiff's allegations as true for purposes
of analysis.
But what of a case where a plaintiff who fell when she caught
the heel of her shoe in a "fissure" that had just developed between
two lanes of pavement sued the contractor for defective performance when he repaved the road thirty-four years earlier? The specter
of service of process on the occupant of a nursing home, for
conduct routinely performed in his forties, is haunting. The nursing
home is fictional, but the case is real and interesting because in it

(N.C. 1982) (upholding statute of repose); see also Lamb v. Wedgewood S. Corp., 286
S.E.2d 876, 883 (N.C. 1982) (holding that legislature may determine when remedy is "legally

cognizable"). 7. Pennsylvania: See supra notes 109-119. 8. Rhode Island: Kennedy v.
Cumberland Eng'g Co., 471 A.2d 195, 198-99 (R.I. 1984) (adopting balancing test, but
balance appears to be struck more or less automatically against total abolition of cause of
action). 9. South Carolina: No cases on point found. Cf. Broome v. Truluck, 241 S.E.2d

739, 740-41 (S.C. 1978) (finding that statute of repose violated equal protection). 10.
Vermont: Levinsky v. Diamond, 559 A.2d 1073, 1086 (Vt. 1989) (concluding that provision
has "never" been held to protect substantive rights).
No section 14 language equivalents were found in the other four states, Georgia, New
Jersey, New York, or Virginia.

M Perkins v. Northeastern Log Homes, 808 S.W.2d 809, 818 (Ky. 1991).
1 Id. at 817.
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a state court with a reputation for enlightened tort and consumer
protection decisions unanimously upheld a ten-year statute of repose. 127 The court said that the legislative action was an "understandable" response to a series of its decisions (adopting a liberal
discovery rule, etc.).2
A problem with most statutes of repose is that as written they
are blunt instruments. But like them or not, one cannot deny the
evidence of a level of discomfort with the tort system their widespread enactment reflects. This evidence should not be dismissed
as merely the results of selfish lobbying. 129 That begs a question,
inasmuch as the defendant groups, composed of citizens with constitutional rights to do so, were at the very least displaying their
dissatisfaction with the system. More to the point, however, is the
improbability of success, even of a massive lobbying effort, on a
matter visible to representatives of any disadvantaged groups (who
are not without lobbies), in the absence of a political estimate that
a larger constituency will find the result at least acceptable.
The recent hue and cry for "tort reform" is familiar history.
The most credible evidence that it is more than merely the hype of
selfish interests is the decision five years ago by the American Law
Institute to launch a study of compensation and liability for product and process injuries. The study was published in April 1991.130
After the 1991 annual meeting of the ALl, its Council announced
plans to undertake a project entitled "Restatement of the Law
Third, Torts: Products Liability," to "supersede the Restatement
131
Second of Torts on the matters addressed.'
The reported fact that the ALl study is a "matter of vigorous
controversy within the Institute' ' 32 suggests the difficulty of arriv127See Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 293 A.2d 662 (N.J. 1972). Henningsen

v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960), a landmark of consumer protection
doctrine in its time, is among the cases underpinning the New Jersey court's reputation.
"I See Rosenberg, 293 A.2d at 667.
'29 Cf. Perkins, 808 S.W.2d at 817; Tabler v. Wallace, 704 S.W.2d 179, 181-82 (Ky.
1986).
M See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, ElNPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY
(reporters' study, April 15, 1991) [hereinafter ALI STUDY (1991)]. The ALI is the organization of practicing lawyers, judges, and law teachers that produces the Restatements. The
Chief Reporter for the study until 1989, was Richard B. Stewart, Esq. of Washington, D.C.
The Chief Reporter since 1989 has been Paul C. Weiler of the Harvard Law School. A
group of four Associate Reporters was actively involved, and the Reporters were assisted
by five "Contributors," two "Special Advisors," and some twenty "Advisors." See id. at
v-vi.
si1See 14 Ta Au REPORTER I (No. 1, Oct. 1991).
132Id. at 2.
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ing at a consensus about what is acceptable (what will work best
and fairly to achieve a variety of goals) in society. Running to
over 1000 pages in two volumes, the study cannot fairly be summarized here. But whatever one's views about the positions taken
in it, the Reporters' observations and analyses are enlightening,
and sometimes fascinating to consider, especially when differences
in conditions in 1891 and 1992 are borne in mind.
A virtue of the study is that it sought to avoid what it calls a
"tortcentric" approach to personal injury policy. In this vein the
Reporters even suggest that lawyers and judges, as well as legislators, also should be "far more conscious than they have ever been
of the need to dovetail their doctrinal and procedural innovations
in tort with what is happening in outside regimes that often dwarf
' These outside regimes include notort litigation in magnitude." 133
fault systems, private and social health and disability insurance
(e.g., Medicare, Social Security Disability Program), markets, and
13 4
regulation.
The Reporters endorse the core functions and principles of the
tort system but make a number of recommendations for change.'35
Reference is made here to the study only for the purpose of
suggesting two points. First, it provides substantial evidence that
society is not altogether accepting of the tort system in its present
form, and that therefore calls for change, perhaps in quite different
forms from the Reporters' recommendations, will persist. Second,
calls for change are most apt to come from outside the circle of
those directly involved in the administration of tort litigation,
simply because that system is tortcentric by design. Lawyers are
properly commanded to give the interests of an individual client
their zealous efforts. Besides, they get pad for winning, not losing.
Attorneys are not apt to go to seminars about the effects of tort
2 ALI STUDY (1991), supra note 130, at 6.
See I id. at 55-251.
,15
Recommendations (with page references to their summary statements) include:
133
13

1.

Retention of basic principles governing manufacturing defects but substantial alterations of

the law of design defects. See 2 id. at 80-82; 2. Virtual elimination of "collateral source"
rules, linked with an end to subrogation. See 2 id. at 176-82; 3. Substantial improvement
of workers' compensation for fatal and seriously disabling injuries (where these systems
tend to be weakest), coupled with an end to third party suits for common law damages.

Technically, this is not a formal recommendation but a proposal the Reporters are "attracted
to." 2 id. at 197-98; 4. Redefinition of entitlement to pain and suffering damages, with
tighter controls on their calculation. See 2 id. at 229-30; 5. Substantial tightening of punitive
damages awards. See 2 id. at 264-65; 6. Awards of reasonable attorney fees as a separate
item of compensable damages. See 2 id. at 315-16.
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doctrine on the cost and availability of products and services to
consumers. To prepare for their expected roles, they attend seminars on the use of an industry of expert witnesses, the selection of
a jury for a type of case and client, etc. Judges decide one case at
a time on highly particularized facts.
A major problem with the jural rights doctrine is that the
people, whether as individuals, lobbies, or some other collective,
cannot talk to a court. Briefs amicus curiae may be filed, but the
virtue of the judicial system is that its primary focus must be on
the trial record and parties before it; judges are not generally
equipped or expected to make textually generalized, interrelated
rule-type decisions based on "legislative facts." The common law
decisions of a court are law, and no better system has been devised
than this technique, by which general principles of law emerge
from small bits of real life experience. But the technique has
worked so well not because judges have a monopoly on wisdom
but because the people have always reserved the power to modify
principles that in the light of mounting experience have failed to
work to their satisfaction. Determining the content of the law has
always been a joint enterprise.
In a world where legislatures are principally responsible for all
the other institutional regimes that address personal injuries, it
does not seem sensible to shut them out from such an integral part
of the institutional framework as the regime of tort litigation.
Volume I of the ALI Study, where facts regarding the "Institutional Framework" are marshaled and interpreted, might generally
be thought to be a "must read" for a legislator. But as matters
now stand, a Kentucky legislator would have to search for an
incentive to indulge the effort.
The above observations should not be understood as an argument in favor of ignoring Kentucky's constitution. They are offered
as additional reasons for disbelieving that the framers ever would
have entertained the ideas about jural rights that have been attributed to them by the Kentucky Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION

In Ludwig v. Johnson,13 6 over the dissents (without opinions)
of Judges Dietzman and Thomas, Judge Rees overruled Johnson

1- 49 S.W.2d 347 (Ky. 1932).
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v. Higgins3 7 as "clearly unsound." A member of the school of
strong opinion writers, he spoke of the "manifest purpose of the
framers ... to preserve and perpetuate the common law," and
about the "imperative mandate" of section 14.138 These are the
myths that gained strength through decades of unexamined repetition by subsequent courts to become today's reality. The present
court, though expanding the doctrine, did not create it. In its more
confined form, the doctrine had come to be supposed to be etched
in stone long before the members of the present court took their
seats. Is it nevertheless material in 1992 that Johnson v. Higgins
comes as close to a case that is irrefutably sound as any we will
find, and that it manifestly cannot be shown to have been the
purpose of the framers to preserve and perpetuate the common
law free of any scrutiny by the ultimate policy making branch of
government?
An unusually apt parallel is found in the United States Supreme
4
39
Court's overruling of Swift v. Tyson' in Erie R.R. v. Tomkins.Y0
Writing for the Court in Swift, Justice Story told federal judges
that in suits ungoverned by any federal law they could apply the
common law according to their lights, independently of what state
judges had announced it to be.' 4' Imagine the habits of thought
that set in during ninety-six years of practice under Swift. In Erie,
the Court found that Justice Story had misinterpreted the federal
Rules of Decision Act, 4 2 but Justice Brandeis said that alone would
not justify overruling such an ancient precedent. What the Court
could not ignore, however, was that Swift's statutory interpretation
had erroneously conceived the scope of the United States Constitution, sending the federal courts down a constitutionally unwarranted path. In Brandeis's famous words, "There is no general
federal common law." 43
Confined to the common law as it existed in 1891, the jural
rights doctrine is thirty years younger than Swift v. Tyson was. In
its expanded mode to encompass an evolving common law, it is
still an infant. Sections 14, 54, and 241 of the constitution have
individual functions to perform. And the General Assembly is
13760

Ky. (3 Met.) 566 (1861). For a discussion of this case, see supra note 68.

I- Ludwig, 49 S.W.2d at 351.
t9 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
1- 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
1' See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1842).
1,228 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988) (current codification).
43 Erie R.R. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
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restrained by a number of other constitutional provisions, such as
the Bill of Rights and the prohibition of "special legislation." But
narrowly or expansively conceived, the formal jural rights doctrine
is founded on a misconception of Kentucky's 1891 constitution. It
should be abandoned.

